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Abstract
This is a comparative study of children’s resource shares in male-headed and female-headed households. To this end we 
estimate a household collective model using a rotating panel of households from the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions 
over a period of 21 years (1990–2010). We find that the gender of the household head is important in determining individual 
resource shares within the household. Our results also indicate that children receive substantially larger resource shares in 
female-headed households than in male-headed ones and hence children who live in relatively poor female-headed households 
are not necessarily worse off. Additionally, the effects of household characteristics on the shares of children are shown to 
vary considerably based on the gender of the household head.
Keywords Children’s resource shares · Female-headed households · Collective model · Jamaica
Introduction
It has long been recognized that family structure may play an 
important role on the socio-economic status of the household 
and its members (see Jeynes 2002). In this regard the grow-
ing incidence of female headship of households across the 
world has motivated considerable policy research because 
of its link to poverty, gender inequality, and child welfare. 
A recent study by the United Nations (2017) estimates the 
proportion of female-headed households (FHHs) to be 34% 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, 27% in Africa , and 
19% in Asia. Importantly, it has been argued widely that, 
compared to male-headed households (MHHs), FHHs are 
likely to be poorer and more vulnerable as women tend to 
have less access to productive resources such as land and 
capital (Buvinic and Gupta 1997), credit (Zeller et al. 1997), 
and receive lower wages compared to men for similar jobs 
(Boxill and Quarless 2005). For instance, the United Nations 
Development Programme (2005, pp. 299–308) estimates that 
women in Latin America and the Caribbean earn only 40% 
of men’s incomes in USD (2003 PPP). This implies that 
FHHs are more likely to raise children with lower health 
and educational outcomes, leading to lower labour market 
outcomes in the long run (Handa 1994). On the other hand, 
the general consensus in the literature is that the preferences 
of women tend to favour children, where studies such as 
Duflo (2003), Duflo and Udry (2004), and Caiumi and Perali 
(2015) have shown that women spend more on child-related 
goods such as food, health and education, while men spend 
more on adult-specific goods, such as tobacco and alcohol. 
Hence, in FHHs, and in single-mother households in par-
ticular, the well-being of children may increase as a result 
of higher expenditure on child-friendly goods. Since both 
arguments are equally plausible, the actual impact of female 
headship on child welfare in specific contexts can only be 
determined empirically.
This study further addresses the issue of female head-
ship and child welfare by investigating the relationship 
between the gender of the household head and the nature of 
intra-household resource allocation towards children using 
a modern collective household model in the context of 
Jamaica. The basic idea behind this approach is to compare 
the spending on goods that are separably consumed, but still 
comparable, by adults and children within a household. To 
the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to compare 
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FHHs to MHHs within this framework. More precisely, the 
few existing studies that have investigated whether children 
are better or worse off in FHHs have done so by compar-
ing expenditure on goods or individual outcomes that are 
not strictly individually assignable, not consumed by both 
adults and children, or are not strictly comparable even if 
consumed by both. For example, while Johnson and Rogers 
(1993) showed that children in FHHs were at least as well 
nourished as those in MHHs, one cannot conclude explicitly 
from this that adults in FHHs have a stronger preference for 
allocating resources towards children than MHHs. Although 
other more recent literature has instead focused on intra-
household allocation and found that women and children 
tend to be poorer than men living in the same household 
(Dunbar et al. 2013; Mangiavacchi et al. 2014), these papers 
have only focused on MHHs. Here we instead estimate the 
resource shares allocated to adults and children within 
MHHs and FHHs.
Jamaica is arguably an interesting test case for the anal-
ysis at hand since it has one of the highest incidences of 
FHHs in the world. According to an executive summary of 
the 2012 Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions, 45.6% of 
all households in Jamaica are female-headed, with 26% of 
these households containing a male-adult resident.1 A high 
percentage of FHHs usually indicates a matrifocal soci-
ety (Safa 2007). In fact, various sociological and anthro-
pological studies have established the central role women 
and mothers play in Jamaica and the Caribbean society at 
large (Massiah 1983; Sargent and Harris 1992; Stuart 1996). 
Relatedly, the Caribbean is also known for its weak conjugal 
bonds, strong consanguineal ties, and unconventional mating 
and residential patterns.2 Additionally, most young adults 
in Jamaica tend to engage in visiting relationships and have 
children before they enter a residential union, such as a com-
mon law relationship3 or marriage (Handa 1996a; Eggles-
ton et al. 1999). These mating patterns usually force young 
women to become the sole breadwinner for the household 
in the absence of a male adult. In contrast to this, there are 
also women who willingly choose to be household heads as 
an adaptive response to local economic conditions, includ-
ing high rates of male unemployment, increasing female 
participation rates (Handa 1996a; Safa 1998), and a high rate 
of emigration of male adults (Massiah 1982). They thus take 
advantage of male absenteeism to secure their own welfare 
and that of their children, and to maintain their independence 
and the custody of their children.
Jamaica has been the subject of a number of previous 
studies on FHHs (e.g., Handa 1994, 1996c, 1998; Louat 
et al. 1993). Whereas Handa (1996a) attempted to identify 
the economic factors that lead to the formation of FHHs in 
Jamaica using a bargaining model of headship choice, Louat 
et al. (1993) and Handa (1994) evaluated the relationship 
between gender, headship and child welfare using reduced 
form regressions. Their findings indicated that children 
raised in FHHs were not necessarily disadvantaged when 
compared to children in MHHs with similar characteris-
tics. This was supported by Handa (1996b) who found that 
FHHs in Jamaica tended to spend more on food, education 
and children’s clothing, and less on alcohol and tobacco. 
However, it is important to note that none of these papers 
estimated the share of resources that is allocated to the dif-
ferent members of the household. More recent literature such 
as Gaiha and Kulkarni (2005), Klasen et al. (2015) and Liu 
et al. (2017) analyzed FHHs in Asia and Latin America. 
Again, these studies did not estimate actual resource shares 
of individual household members.
Within Jamaica’s unique sociocultural context, we esti-
mated and conducted a comparative analysis of children’s 
resource shares in MHHs and FHHs using the modern 
household collective model developed by Dunbar et al. 
(2013) (DLP hereafter). We applied this model to a rotat-
ing panel constructed from the Jamaican Survey of Living 
Conditions (JSLC hereafter) for the period from 1990 to 
2010. In terms of methodology, our study is also original 
since, to the best of our knowledge, this kind of collective 
model has not yet been used with panel data. Using such 
data allowed us to control (at least partially) for possible 
endogeneity in our model by accounting for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneities within households. We did this 
by incorporating Mundlak’s (1978) approach to panel data 
into the DLP model. In particular, we included time aver-
ages of all time-varying covariates (also known as Mundlak 
terms) in our regression model to control for household time 
invariant effects. Similar to Roberts and Taylor (2017) who 
also accounted for individual fixed effects in the context of 
intra-household commuting choices, we implemented our 
model using a seemingly unrelated regression model.
Theoretical Framework
Traditionally in economics, households are known as uni-
tary models and are depicted as single decision making 
units even if they are comprised of very different models 
1 Partnered FHHs usually result when a man is unable to provide 
financially for his family, is away seeking job opportunities (Massiah 
1982) or when the household lives in a property owned by the woman 
(Handa 1996a).
2 According to Massiah (1983) and Safa (1998),these weak conju-
gal unions originated during the slave trade as married slaves were 
usually sold separately. Mothers and children were, however, sold 
together creating strong consanguineal ties between mothers and chil-
dren.
3 A common law relationship exists when a couple share a residence 
but is not legally married.
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(Vermeulen 2002a). Importantly, this approach assumes that 
household preference, and hence expenditure choices, coin-
cide with individual preferences. However, as a response to 
the general empirical rejection of the unitary model, the col-
lective model was pioneered by Chiappori (1988). More spe-
cifically, a collective model recognizes that households are 
made up of different individuals, each characterized by the 
individual members. Moreover, a collective model assumes 
that these individuals collectively make Pareto-efficient deci-
sions, i.e., where, ceteris paribus, no decision could make 
one individual better off without making at least one other 
household member worse off. Arguably, this approach is 
much more suited to investigate questions of differences in 
intra-household resource allocation.
In this study we used the DLP version of the collective 
household model which estimates resource shares of individ-
ual household members with a particular focus on the shares 
of children. Notably, in many earlier versions of the col-
lective model, children were not treated as individuals who 
have preferences of their own, but rather as public goods for 
parents or as a household characteristic (see Blundell et al. 
2005 for example). As argued by DLP, children are unique 
members of the household because in most cases they are 
unable to make a choice as to which household to belong to, 
may find it difficult to leave in strenuous circumstances, and 
do not contribute to household income substantially. Hence, 
they are likely to be the most vulnerable individuals within 
a household.
Assuming Price Invariant Generalized Logarithmic pref-
erences (Muellbauer 1976) for household members, the 
model takes the following form, where we for simplicity 
suppress time subscripts and other determining demographic 
factors:
for i = a, c and j = 1, 2, 3, 4 . The subscripts i and j repre-
sent individual and household types, respectively. House-
hold types are determined by the size of the household; 
j = 1, 2, 3, 4 indexes households with one, two, three, and 
four children, respectively. Each household consists of 
two individual types: adults denoted by i = a , and children 
denoted by i = c . Wij represents the household budget share 
of individual i’s private assignable good, y total household 
expenditure, ij the resource share of individual i in house-
hold type j, and ij and ij are the intercept preference param-
eters and the latent slope preference parameters, respectively.
Two important restrictions allow one to identify Equation 
(1). First, resource shares ij and household expenditures y 
are assumed to be independent of each other. While this 
may seem like a rather restrictive assumption, Menon et al. 
(2012) and Cherchye et al. (2012), using Italian and Dutch 
(1)
Waj(y) = aj(aj + aj ln aj) + aj aj ln y
Wcj(y) = jcj(cj + cj ln cj) + jcj cj ln y
data, respectively, found that it holds.4 Moreover, other vari-
ables that are highly correlated with household expenditures, 
such as income or wealth, can be used instead. The second 
identifying assumption involves invoking at least one of the 
following semi-parametric restrictions on the individual 
budget-share equations, which are interpretable as Engel 
curves (Lewbel and Pendakur 2008). The SAP (Similar 
Across People) restriction assumes that the preferences of 
individuals within households with a particular number of 
children are similar in certain limited ways. This implies, 
for instance, that individuals in one-child households have 
similar tastes. As a consequence, ij is specified as j for all i. 
The SAT (Similar Across Types) restriction, in contrast, sup-
poses that the preferences of individuals are similar across 
household types. For example, under the SAT fathers would 
have similar preferences irrespective of the number of the 
children they have. In correspondence, ij is denoted as i for 
all j. If one assumes both SAP and SAT, then ij becomes 
 for all i and j. It is important to note, that unlike DLP, 
we were unable to estimate the share of men and women 
separately as we did not have separate private assignable 
goods for men and women in our data set. This was, how-
ever, not a huge loss in our context since our main focus was 
to compare children’s resource shares in MHHs to children’s 
resource shares in FHHs.
Data
The Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) is a 
nation-wide survey that was introduced in 1988 to moni-
tor the economic welfare of households within the country. 
Since 1990 the survey has been carried out on an annual 
basis (except for 2011 when no data was collected). The 
JSLC is tagged to the national Labour Force Survey (LFS 
hereafter) which is carried out using a one-half panel 
design. This means that half of the households from a pre-
vious round of the LFS, and by extension the JSLC, were 
included in the current sample as long as the master frame 
was not changed. This one-half panel design enabled us to 
construct a rotating panel of households for the following 
years: 1990–1992, 1993–1994, 1995–1996, 1997–1998, 
1998–2000, 2002–2003, 2004–2006, and 2007–2010. We 
followed Handa’s (2008) procedure in matching households 
across different rounds of the JSLC. More specifically, we 
constructed a unique household identifier that was used to 
match households across years. Before households were 
4 In order to test this assumption one would need information on how 
much of total expenditure is spent on children, which, unfortunately, 
the Jamaican data set does not provide, so that we cannot explicitly 
test this.
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matched, we verified that the gender of the household head 
had not changed, that his/her age had not changed by more 
than 2 years, and that the household size did not change by 
more than 2 people. Using this criteria, and similar to Handa 
(2008), we were able to match about 70% of the households 
across years. Our match rates were slightly higher in later 
years of the sample period. We used monthly Consumer 
Price Indices from the Bank of Jamaica to deflate all mon-
etary values with December 2006 as the base value.
The JSLC’s core modules included health, education, 
consumption, nutrition, and housing. For most years an 
additional module was included that focused on specific 
subjects such as remittances, coping strategies, ageing and 
employment. Adult’s and children’s clothing and footwear 
were used as the private assignable goods because expendi-
tures on these goods were observed separately in the JSLC.
We restricted our sample to monogamous nuclear house-
holds. This was done for three reasons. First, the private 
assignable goods that were available from our data set 
allowed individual resource shares to be easily identified in 
these kinds of households. Taking this a step further, we also 
excluded households with children older than 13 to ensure 
that clothing and footwear could not be shared between 
adults and children within the same household since these 
goods were crucial for the identification of resource shares. 
In addition to this, the JSLC treated children older than 13 as 
adults. Therefore, they were able to enter the labour market 
freely. Second, restricting our sample to nuclear monoga-
mous households ensured that the structure of MHHs and 
FHHs were as similar as possible and hence made them 
more comparable. This also meant that conclusions drawn 
from the comparative analysis were likely to be more robust 
and reliable. Third, and most importantly, it significantly 
reduced the bias that may have been present in the identifica-
tion of household heads. These biases were usually greater 
in extended family households where the oldest male adult 
assumed the position of the household head even if he was 
not the individual responsible for the upkeep and mainte-
nance of the family (Handa 1994). Finally, one should note 
that we also included partnered FHHs in our sample because 
they enabled us to determine whether the presence of a male 
adult in a FHH adversely affected the resource shares chil-
dren receive when compared to single-mother households.
Empirical Framework
In an attempt to adjust the original DLP model to fit a panel 
data set where we were able to follow households over 
time, as we used here, we incorporated Mundlak’s (1978) 
approach as this enabled us to control for unobserved het-
erogeneities at the household level which did not vary with 
time. Importantly accounting for these household fixed 
effects allowed us to control (at least partially) for possi-
ble endogeneity that may have existed in the original DLP 
model. In contrast, DLP addressed these endogeneity issues 
in their original study by using instrumental variables. In 
cases, such as ours, where similar viable instrumental vari-
ables could not be obtained from the available data set, con-
trolling for household heterogeneities in a panel-data setting 
is an alternative route researchers can take to control for 
possible endogeneity in the DLP model.
One can consider the Mundlak (1978) framework using 
the simple unobserved effects model below:
where s = (1, 2,… , S) denotes the cross-sectional unit 
(which is the household in our case), and t = (1, 2,… , T) 
denotes the time period. xst is a matrix of observable explan-
atory variables which may change across both s and t, or 
across s but not t, or across t but not s.  represents the 
matrix of coefficients, vs denotes the unobserved heteroge-
neities which are time-invariant and ust represents idiosyn-
cratic disturbances which vary across s and t.
The key concern with vs in this kind of setup is whether or 
not it is correlated with xst . If the two terms are correlated, 
a fixed effects estimation approach is appropriate. However, 
standard fixed effects estimation can be difficult to carry out 
in non-linear models, such as the DLP framework. Under 
such circumstances, a correlated random effects (CRE) 
framework such as the Mundlak approach can provide a use-
ful alternative. One should note that the difference between 
this framework and the pure fixed effects approach is that 
with CRE, the relationship between vs and xst is modelled in 
a very specific way (Wooldridge 2010, p. 286). More specifi-
cally, Mundlak (1978) allows vs to depend on time averages 
or panel-level averages of the observed covariates (xst) that 
vary over time so that:
where x̄s denotes the time averages of time-varying covari-
ates in xst ,  is the matrix of coefficients, and ws is the error 
term which is independently and identically distributed. 
These time averages or panel-level averages are usually 
referred to as Mundlak terms. Substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. 
(2) gives the following expanded model:
It is important to note that the error term in Eq. (4) is a sum 
of ws and ust . A generalized least squares (GLS) estimation 
of Eq. (4) is efficient and produces an estimator of  that 
equals the fixed effects estimator (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005, p. 719).
We incorporated this framework into the DLP model 
by including Mundlak terms in the intercept preference 
(2)yst = xst + vs + ust
(3)vs = x̄s𝜋 + ws
(4)yst = xst𝜓 + x̄s𝜋 + ws + ust.
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parameters (ij) , the slope preference parameters (ij ), and 
the resource share functions (ij) of Equation (1). Then we 
estimated Equation (1) using an iterated feasible generalized 
non-linear least squares estimation method within a non-
linear seemingly unrelated model framework. This produced 
the fixed effects estimator for the explanatory variables that 
varied across s and t. Due to the complicated nature of the 
error term in this model, we obtained fully robust inferences 
by using an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix.5
Based on our data set, we included the following demo-
graphic variables in our model: the region of residence (rural 
area, other urban area, and the Kingston Metropolitan Area 
as the reference category), the age of the man, the age of the 
woman, the minimum age of the children in the household, 
the number of children aged less than three, the proportion 
of male children, dummies indicating whether the man and 
the woman have completed tertiary education, a dummy 
indicating whether the household receives remittances or 
other support from family and friends elsewhere in Jamaica, 
a dummy indicating whether the household receives any 
form of public assistance or poor relief, and a dummy indi-
cating whether a male-adult is resident in a FHH. These 
demographic variables were included in both the resource 
share functions ( ij ) and the preference functions ( ij and ij ) 
of Equation (1) and hence could not be described as distribu-
tion factors. This term in the literature is used to describe 
variables that affect resource shares but do not affect the 
preferences of individuals in the household. In some pre-
vious versions of the collective model, distribution factors 
played a vital role in identifying changes in resource shares 
(see Chiappori and Ekeland 2009; Browning et al. 1994; 
Chiappori et al. 2002; Vermeulen 2002b for examples of 
such studies). However, the validity of distribution factors 
can be difficult to test. Fortunately, the DLP model does not 
need distribution factors in the identification of the levels of 
individual resource shares within the household.
Following DLP, we estimated our log-linear Engel curves 
(Equation (1)) using an iterated non-linear seemingly unre-
lated regression model. We allowed the errors to be cor-
related across the two equations. To construct the Mundlak 
terms we calculated time averages or panel-level averages 
of all demographic variables that changed across time. 
Apart from variables indicating the region of residence, all 
other demographic variables varied across time. Hence, we 
constructed Mundlak terms for 10 out of 12 demographic 
covariates.
Let d = (d1, d2,… , d12) be a vector of all the demo-
graphic variables, let g = (g1, g2,… , g10) be a vector of 
the Mundlak terms and b = (b1,… , b4) be a vector of four 
dummy variables, each indicating a household type j. The 
vector b played the role of the constant for each household 
type in ij , ij , and ij . For the baseline model, ij and ij were 
specified as linear in b and d for a maximum of 16 coeffi-
cients each. As already mentioned, ij was specified accord-
ing to the semi-parametric restriction imposed on the Engel 
curves. For SAP, ij was specified as linear in b and d for a 
maximum of 16 coefficients. For SAT, ij was specified as 
linear in a constant and d for each of the 2 individual types 
for a maximum of 26 coefficients. When both SAP and SAT 
were imposed, ts was specified as linear in a constant and d 
for a maximum of 13 coefficients.
The parameters ij and ij were specified as linear in b, 
d, and g for a maximum of 26 coefficients each. For SAP, 
ij was specified as linear in b, d, and g for a maximum 
of 26 coefficients. For SAT, ij was specified as linear in a 
constant, d, and g for each of the 2 individual types for a 
maximum of 46 coefficients. When both SAP and SAT are 
imposed, ts was specified as linear in a constant, d, and g 
for a maximum of 23 coefficients.6
Results and Discussion
Summary Statistics
Our final sample consisted of 479 MHHs of a couple with 
one to four children, 304 FHHs of a single mother with 
one to four children, and 159 FHHs of a couple with one 
to four children. These nuclear monogamous households 
made up 46% of total households in the Jamaican SLC 
surveys. According to Rosenhouse (1989), MHHs usually 
indicate an intact couple whereas FHHs usually represent 
a single female or a female in some sort of consensual 
union. In our sample, we found that all partnered house-
holds (whether MHH or FHH) indicated an intact couple 
in that the couple was either married or had a common 
law relationship. About 58% of the couples in the MHHs 
were in a common law relationship, while 42% are mar-
ried. Similarly, 79% of the couples in partnered FHHs 
were in a common law relationship while 21% are mar-
ried. The higher percentage of common law relationships 
among partnered FHHs was not surprising as one of the 
social requirements for marriage for a man in Jamaican 
culture was to own a house (Handa 1996a). It is therefore 
plausible that in these partnered FHHs the women tended 
to own the houses in which they lived. It could also be 
5 We implemented this in Stata using the “cluster” option instead of 
the “robust” option.
6 We were unable to add year dummies as our models did not con-
verge due to relatively small sample sizes. We attempted to include 
period dummies and found that our results did not change signifi-
cantly for the models that do converge. This was probably due to the 
fact that we followed households for just 2 years on average.
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an indication that the man in the household was unable 
to bear the economic burden of maintaining the house-
hold and hence had very little bargaining power in the 
household (Handa 1996a). The single-mother FHHs in our 
sample suited the definition of FHHs found in Rosenhouse 
(1989) to a large extent; only 9% of them were married or 
engaged in a common law relationship. Eighty seven per 
cent of them were either single or engaged in a visiting 
relationship, while 4% of them reported to be in no sort of 
union. In total, our sample was made up of 942 households 
and 2043 observations (on average, each household was 
followed for 2 two years).
We present summary statistics according to the differ-
ent household categories in Table 1. The men in our sam-
ple were generally older than the women for all partnered 
households. On average, women were more likely than men 
to attend tertiary education. According to Reddock (2009), 
the female share of tertiary education in Jamaica was about 
70%. This was because in Jamaica the pecuniary returns 
associated with additional education was much larger for 
Table 1  Summary statistics for sample by family type
Standard deviations are in parentheses
MHHs FHHs All
Couples with children Couples with children Single mothers with 
children
General characteristics
 Men’s age 36.2 34.9 – 35.9
(8.51) (7.62) (8.34)
 Women’s age 31.3 30.5 32.3 31.5
(8.28) (6.78) (7.86) (7.96)
 Men’s tertiary education dummy 0.09 0.02 – 0.08
(0.29) (0.15) (0.27)
 Women’s tertiary education dummy 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.09
(0.29) (0.24) (0.28) (0.28)
 Proportion of male children 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51
(0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.40)
 Average age of children 5.6 6.1 7.0 6.1
(3.06) (2.86) (2.88) (3.04)
 Rural household dummy 0.55 0.48 0.40 0.49
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
 Weekly expenditure in J$ 8569.30 6868.08 6042.24 7519.14
(6852.48) (3686.95) (5218.34) (6088.26)
Budget shares
 Adult’s clothing and footwear 0.056 0.057 0.055 0.056
(0.041) (0.037) (0.046) (0.042)
 Children’s clothing and footwear 0.041 0.046 0.057 0.047
(0.030) (0.031) (0.038) (0.034)
 Food 0.491 0.543 0.516 0.507
(0.194) (0.162) (0.187) (0.188)
 Housing 0.111 0.093 0.124 0.113
(0.110) (0.112) (0.123) (0.115)
 Transportation and communication 0.114 0.103 0.085 0.103
(0.107) (0.094) (0.077) (0.097)
 Health 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.020
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
 Education 0.040 0.037 0.051 0.043
(0.071) (0.043) (0.059) (0.064)
 Vices 0.012 0.013 0.006 0.010
(0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.031)
 Sample size (households) 479 159 304 942
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women than for men (Handa 1996c; Boxill and Quarless 
2005). Men, on the other hand were more likely to pursue 
vocational training after their secondary school education 
(STATIN and PIOJ 2014). Similar to Handa (1996c), we 
found that FHHs were more likely to live in urban house-
holds. It was also clear from weekly expenditure values that 
on average MHHs were richer than FHHs.
Turning to the budget shares of goods which represent the 
weights which each household gives to each of these goods, 
one sees that all households spent most of their income on 
food, housing, and transportation and communication. With 
regard to the private assignable goods, the share of adult 
clothing and footwear was roughly equal across all house-
hold categories.7 In other words, equal weights were given to 
adult clothing and footwear in each household category. On 
the other hand, FHHs, and especially single-mother house-
holds, tended to put a higher weight on children’s clothing 
and footwear than MHHs, although MHHs may have spent 
more in absolute terms on children’s clothing and footwear 
due to higher overall expenditure levels. Single-mother 
households were more likely to have highest budget shares 
for other child-related goods such as health and education, 
and the lowest budget shares for vices (alcohol and tobacco), 
which were more adult-specific. The share of vices doubled 
in all partnered households and was highest in partnered 
FHHs where the male adult was more likely to be idle and 
not involved in any economic activity. This could be seen as 
preliminary evidence in support of Duflo (2003), Duflo and 
Udry (2004), and Caiumi and Perali (2015), who showed 
that women’s preferences tended to be more child-friendly. 
On average, we also found that single mothers tended to 
spend more on housing compared to other households. This 
may be because a larger proportion of single-mother house-
holds lived in urban areas where housing is more expensive.
Resource Share Estimates
In this section, we present the main empirical findings of our 
paper. Both the baseline model and the model with Mundlak 
terms were carried out for all MHHs, all FHHs, and also for 
single-mother households only. For each of the three house-
hold categories, - MHHs, FHHs, and single mother house-
holds - we experimented with imposing the SAP restriction 
alone, the SAT restriction alone, and both SAP and SAT 
restrictions. We found the SAT restriction to be the weak-
est identifying assumption for all household categories. 
As explained by DLP, one may need a very large sample 
size to produce precise estimates when the SAT restriction 
alone is imposed. In this section, we focus on estimates from 
imposing both restrictions, because for the most part these 
estimates are the most precise. Also, upon testing the valid-
ity of the SAT restriction given the SAP restriction, we con-
clude that the SAT restriction holds in our data set once the 
SAP restriction has already been imposed.8
Table  2 presents the estimates of the resource share 
functions ( ij ) when both SAP and SAT were imposed as 
identifying restrictions for the the three household catego-
ries. Following DLP, the household size dummies outlined 
the resource shares for adults, children, and each child in 
a reference household. In our case, this household lived in 
the Kingston Metropolitan Area, did not receive any sup-
port from friends and family within or outside the country, 
and did not receive any public assistance or poor relief. All 
adults in this household had not completed tertiary education 
and all children within the household are girls.
Generally, a relatively smaller share of resources was allo-
cated to children in MHHs. In MHHS, children’s resource 
shares ranged from 31 to 8% per child as the number of 
children in the household increased, while they ranged from 
52 to 19% per child in all FHHs and from 56 to 21% per 
child in single-mother households. This can be attributed to 
a number of reasons. First, while all MHHs in our sample 
consisted of 2 adults, close to 70% of the FHHs were com-
posed of a single adult. Although couples seemed to enjoy 
large scale economies (when one compared the estimates 
for MHHs and single-mother households for instance), chil-
dren appeared to benefit with regards to resource shares from 
having just one adult present in the household. Second, this 
could indicate that the preferences of women in Jamaica 
were more child-related and hence, as household heads, they 
were able to allocate a larger share of resources to the chil-
dren. We also noticed that, unlike MHHs, the total share of 
resources for adults consistently declined with the number 
of children in FHHs and single-mother households. For all 
three categories of households, the per-capita share for chil-
dren decreased substantially as the number of children in 
the household increases. Again, this could be an indication 
that large scale economies to consumption exist among the 
children as well.
With regard to the region of residence, children were 
generally worse off in terms of resource shares if they lived 
in the Kingston Metropolitan Area. Up to 15% of resource 
7 The omitted category that would have made the total sum of shares 
equal to one are all other goods not listed in the table.
8 Following DLP, we do this by first estimating our model impos-
ing only the SAP restriction. We then test the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the household size dummies inside ij are statistically 
equal using a Wald test as this is equivalent to imposing the SAT 
restriction. For all three household categories, we find that this null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected with p-values of 0.2715, 0.3729, and 
0.3017 for MHHs, FHHs, and single-mother households respectively. 
Therefore, we conclude that the SAT restriction is valid once the SAP 
restriction has already been imposed.
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shares were diverted from children to adults who lived in 
this area. This holds irrespective of the gender of the house-
hold head. However, the shares of children were highest in 
rural areas for MHHs and were highest in other urban areas 
for FHHs. Since the cost of living was likely to be higher in 
urban areas (especially the capital city) than in rural areas 
(Kurre 2003), parents in the Kingston Metropolitan Area 
tended to spend more on other goods such as housing and 
utilities. For instance, within our sample, households liv-
ing in the Kingston Metropolitan Area allocated about 15% 
of total expenditure to housing and utility bills on average, 
whereas rural households allocated only 8% of their total 
expenditure to housing and utility bills. One finds a similar 
trend for non-consumption goods such as insurance and the 
repayment of loans.
Another similarity that existed between MHHs and 
FHHs was that children’s shares decreased substantially 
(by 12% to 23%) as the number of children less than three 
years old increased within the household. Since, according 
to the National Academy of Sciences (2015) 95% of all 
children in Jamaica were enrolled in school by their third 
birthday, this result may indicate that parents tended to 
spend a lot more on their children once they were enrolled 
in school. These school-related expenses included the cost 
of transportation to school, extra lessons, books, and tui-
tion. Also the magnitude of this effect was higher in FHHs 
than in MHHs. This was not surprising because FHHs 
and single mothers in particular, tended to invest more in 
the education of their children than MHHs. This may be 
due to the fact that in Jamaica the responsibility of child 
care fell predominantly on women. Hence, children were 
more likely to take care of their elderly mothers than their 
elderly fathers (Handa 1996a; Wyss 1999; Handa 1996c).
Table 2  Resource share estimates for Jamaican households
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. † p <0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<.001




Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
One child Adults 0.688** 0.083 0.479** 0.069 0.441** 0.068
Children 0.312** 0.083 0.521** 0.069 0.559** 0.068
Each child 0.312** 0.083 0.521** 0.069 0.559** 0.068
Two children Adults 0.636** 0.086 0.416** 0.073 0.412** 0.076
Children 0.364** 0.086 0.584** 0.073 0.588** 0.076
Each child 0.182** 0.043 0.292** 0.035 0.294** 0.038
Three children Adults 0.594** 0.085 0.416** 0.090 0.410** 0.088
Children 0.406** 0.085 0.584** 0.090 0.590** 0.088
Each child 0.135** 0.028 0.195** 0.030 0.197** 0.029
Four children Adults 0.684** 0.105 0.261** 0.098 0.150 0.105
Children 0.316** 0.105 0.739** 0.098 0.850** 0.105
Each child 0.079** 0.026 0.185** 0.025 0.213** 0.026
Other urban areas Adults −0.081* 0.038 −0.109** 0.039 −0.147** 0.049
Children 0.081* 0.038 0.109** 0.039 0.147** 0.049
Rural areas Adults −0.144** 0.032 −0.082* 0.041 −0.117* 0.048
Children 0.144** 0.032 0.082* 0.041 0.117* 0.048
Number of children < 3years old Adults 0.119* 0.054 0.188** 0.068 0.229** 0.067
Children −0.119* 0.054 −0.188** 0.068 −0.229** 0.067
Proportion of male children Adults 0.103 0.110 −0.152* 0.086 −0.194* 0.089
Children −0.103 0.110 0.152† 0.086 0.194* 0.089
Head completed tertiary education Adults −0.113† 0.063 0.249** 0.055 0.211** 0.065
Children 0.113† 0.063 −0.249** 0.055 −0.211** 0.065
Support from others (incl remittances) Adults −0.003 0.035 −0.062 0.038 −0.094* 0.043
Children 0.003 0.035 0.062 0.038 0.094* 0.043
Public assistance Adults −0.167† 0.091 0.001 0.087 0.005 0.085
Children 0.167† 0.091 −0.001 0.087 −0.005 0.085
Partner present in FHH Adults – – 0.170** 0.063 - –
Children – – −0.170** 0.063 – –
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The next covariate of interest related to gender bias within 
the household. Our results showed that single-mother house-
holds had a strong preference for male children; about 19% 
of household resources were diverted from adults to children 
as the proportion of boys to girls rose. While this was true to 
a smaller extent in partnered FHHs, there appeared to be no 
such bias in MHHs. Studies such as DLP and Rose (1999) 
have also found some forms of gender inequality in favour 
of the boy child within the household. In patriarchal cultures 
like those of Eastern and Southern Asia, this is the common 
practice (Das Gupta et al. 2003). However, some anthropo-
logical and ethnographic studies, such as Sargent and Harris 
(1992), found that girls were generally preferred to boys in 
Jamaica, although they observed that often a special bond 
existed between mothers and sons. They based their argu-
ments on evidence from the patterns of child abandonment, 
health, and adoption practices.
In spite of the fact that our results seem to conflict with 
studies from these other disciplines, we argue that by analys-
ing gender bias in Jamaica from an economic perspective, 
our findings enrich the pool of knowledge that is already 
available on the subject. According to Handa (1996a), sin-
gle mothers recognize that their older children can become 
assets to the household, in that they are able to contribute to 
household income. This then allows a single mother to be 
less dependent on her partner(s) and to maintain her inde-
pendence. Hence, single mothers may prefer boys to girls 
because they are more likely to bring in income at an earlier 
age since they tend to enter the labour market earlier than 
girls do (Handa 1998). According to Boxill and Quarless 
(2005), the rate of absenteeism from school for boys is about 
three times that of girls because culturally boys are allowed 
to participate in the labour market at a very early age. Girls, 
on the other hand, usually stay in school and spend the rest 
of their time engaged in domestic activities (STATIN and 
PIOJ 2014).
The level of education that the household head attained 
was also an important factor in the household decision-
making process. In MHHs, a man who had completed ter-
tiary education tended to divert about 11.3% of resources 
from adults to children. Since previous evidence shows that 
women tend to be more concerned about the welfare of chil-
dren, this finding could indicate that a more educated man 
is likely to be more willing to accommodate the preferences 
of his partner. Hence, similar to what Handa (1994) finds, 
children may also benefit from the presence of a female deci-
sion maker in the household who is not necessarily the head 
of the household.
In contrast to MHHs, a female head who had completed 
tertiary education tended to divert over 20% of household 
resources from children to adults. This was very surprising 
given that women are known to be more sensitive to the 
needs of their children. However, upon further investigation, 
we found that compared to their counterparts who had no 
tertiary education, female heads who had completed tertiary 
education tended to spend significantly more on housing and 
education and significantly less on children’s clothing and 
footwear. This is evident in Table 3 which presents the aver-
age expenditure shares of these goods for female heads who 
have completed tertiary education and those who have not. 
These average values are also presented separately for each 
region of residence. From this table, it is clear that these 
findings are true particularly in the Kingston Metropolitan 
Area. Although housing is not seen as a typical child-related 
good, it may very well be in the Jamaican context. Accord-
ing to the World Bank (2004, pp. 45, 46), urban poverty in 
Jamaica is associated with vices such as crime and violence. 
Hence, especially in the KMA, high-income-earning female 
heads who have completed tertiary education (Boxill and 
Quarless 2005) tended to move into more decent, respect-
able, and often gated communities where housing tends to be 
very expensive in order to provide a safer and more nurtur-
ing environment for their children. These women also tended 
to send their children to private primary schools which are 
very costly (Heyneman and Stern 2014). We can therefore 
conclude that, even though all female heads care about their 
children’s needs, their spending patterns may differ depend-
ing on their level of education (a variable which was highly 
correlated to her level of income) and their region of resi-
dence. Accordingly, it may be profitable in certain scenarios 
to analyze expenditure shares of other goods that are not 
traditionally known to be child-related. It is worth noting 
Table 3  Average expenditure 
shares for FHHs
a KMA stands for Kingston Metropolitan Area.
b TE stands for tertiary education
KMAa Other urban Rural All
Head Head Head Head Head Head Head Head
TEb no TE TE no TE TE no TE TE no TE
Children’s clothing 
and footwear
0.036 0.058 0.033 0.050 0.040 0.055 0.036 0.055
Housing 0.213 0.139 0.147 0.112 0.126 0.083 0.174 0.109
Education 0.053 0.049 0.086 0.044 0.040 0.042 0.056 0.045
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that these findings featured prominently in FHHs and not 
in MHHs because females in Jamaica were more likely to 
complete tertiary education and were also more likely to 
live in urban areas (STATIN and PIOJ 2014; Handa 1996c).
Support that a household in Jamaica receives from exter-
nal sources in monetary form or in the form of goods and 
services usually comes in two forms: support received from 
family and friends living elsewhere in Jamaica or in another 
country and public assistance or poor relief from the govern-
ment (including food stamps, school feeding programme, 
and PATH9). From Table 2, our results showed that pub-
lic assistance increased the shares of children in MHHs 
by almost 17%, whereas support received from family and 
friends (including remittances) led to a rise in children’s 
resource shares by 9.4% in single-mother households. For 
single-mother households, the most likely reason for this is 
the common practice of child fostering in Jamaica, where 
children are sent to live with a member of the extended fam-
ily or a friend. According to Wyss (1995), in 1989 more than 
half of Jamaican children did not live with their biological 
fathers, about a quarter did not live with their biological 
mothers, and about one-fifth lived apart from both parents. 
These biological parents usually send money and/or goods 
to help with the upkeep of their children. In addition to 
this, remittances are becoming more and more important 
in Jamaica because of the increase in emigration of adults 
(especially the male adult) to other countries to look for 
better employment (Massiah 1982). As stated by Stephen-
son and Wilsker (2016), in 2009 Jamaica was the 14th most 
reliant country on remittances in the world, with remittances 
comprising close to 15% of the country’s GDP. This reliance 
of single-mother households on remittances and other forms 
of support from family and friends may cause them to be 
more vulnerable to economic and social shocks since these 
sources of income are relatively less stable (Benfield 2010).
Last but not least, we found that the presence of a male 
adult in a FHH reduced the share of children by 17%. As 
already indicated, this means that children who lived with 
single mothers tend to have higher resource shares than 
children who live in partnered FHHs. This could be due 
to the fact that an unpartnered female head is able to fully 
implement her preferences without having to bargain with 
a man. It is however important to note that, children may 
benefit both socially and emotionally from the guidance, 
discipline, and support that a male adult in the household 
provides (Handa 1994). Unfortunately, our study is unable 
to take intangible benefits such as these into account.
Conclusion
With the increase in the incidence of FHHs in the developing 
world, investigating the nature of resource share allocation 
in these households has become crucial for the development 
and effective targeting of redistribution programmes. So far, 
most studies on household decision-making have focused on 
the traditional MHHs consisting of a couple with children. 
This study contributes to the literature by carrying out a 
comparative study of children’s resource shares in MHHs 
and FHHs (including single-mother households) using a col-
lective household model developed by Dunbar et al. (2013). 
We extend this model by incorporating Mundlak’s (1978) 
approach. The extended model is then applied to a rotating 
panel of Jamaican households covering the period between 
1990 and 2010. Using a panel data set allows us to account 
for unobserved household heterogeneities that are constant 
over time, thereby providing an alternative route to dealing 
with possible endogeneity that may be present in the DLP 
model.
We find that in Jamaica the gender of the household 
head is an important determinant of the final outcome. In 
particular, our findings show that the shares of children are 
substantially higher in FHHs (especially in single-mother 
households) than in MHHs, where children in single-mother 
households receive 56% to 85% of household resources, 
while children in MHHs receive only 31% to 41%. In fact, 
children may be better off in single-mother households than 
in partnered FHHs as a male-adult tends to divert about 17% 
of household resources from children to adults in partnered 
FHHs. Hence, children in relatively poor single-mother 
households may be compensated by the higher shares they 
receive and thus may not necessarily be worse off when 
compared to children in MHHs or partnered FHHs. We also 
find a strong preference for the boy child in FHHs. This may 
result from the fact that boys are more likely to contrib-
ute significantly to future household income as they tend to 
enter the labour market at an earlier age compared to girls 
(STATIN and PIOJ 2014). We also show that the spending 
patterns of female heads differ depending on their level of 
education and their region of residence. More specifically, 
even though empirical evidence suggests that women tend 
to care more about their children’s needs, their preferences 
may be expressed by spending on different kinds of goods 
depending on whether they have completed tertiary educa-
tion and whether they live in an urban or rural area. Our find-
ings also indicate that remittances and other support from 
family and friends affect the shares that children receive in 
single-mother households to a greater extent than public 
assistance. This may be due to the culture of child foster-
ing in Jamaica. More generally, our study demonstrates that 
an increased cultural awareness of the region in question is 
9 PATH is an acronym for the Programme for Advancement through 
Health and Education. This programme is a conditional cash transfer 
programme that was created in 2001 and is aimed at increasing the 
welfare of children in poor households through human capital devel-
opment.
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a crucial component in understanding the nature of intra-
household resource distribution in FHHs.
Finally, it must be noted that our analysis suffers from 
some drawbacks. First, we are unable to distinguish between 
men’s resource shares and women’s resource shares because 
of the unavailability of a separate private assignable good 
for men and women in the JSLC. Second, it is also impos-
sible to check whether a child lives with his or her biological 
parents for a considerable number of years in the JSLC (from 
1992 to 1999). Thirdly, it may very well be that females 
that have a stronger preference for children may choose to 
form their own households rather than become part of a male 
headed household. Whether it is these differences in pref-
erences among females or some other feature peculiar to 
female headed household structures could not be determined 
from our analysis. All these additional pieces of informa-
tion, however, would have greatly increased the depth of 
our understanding of intra-household resource allocation in 
FHHs vis-à-vis MHHs.
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